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COMMENTS 
ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL v. 
WEBSTER COUNTY: ARE PROPOSITION 
13's DAYS NUMBERED? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A taxation system1 similar in practice to California's2 was 
ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Web-
ster County, West Virginia. 3 As a result of this decision, the fu-
ture of Proposition 13,4 which has kept property taxes affordable 
for millions of Californians, is uncertain. ' 
This Comment will first. discuss Proposition 13 and the 
cases which have interpreted it. The Allegheny Court's decision 
will then be closely analyzed in an attempt to predict the out-
come of a constitutional challenge to Proposition 13. Lastly, 
changes to Proposition 13 will be recommended that could 
equalize taxes for all property owners without destroying the tax 
protection sought by the voters when they enacted the initiative. 
II. PROPOSITION 13 
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PROPOSITION 13 
Before the enactment of Proposition 13, real property in 
California was annually re-appraised for taxation purposes at a 
percentage of the price it would sell for on the open market:1 
1. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
2. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. 
3. 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989). 
4. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
290 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:289 
During the 1970's, property values sharply increased6 and the 
taxing authorities increased real estate assessments to reflect the 
higher values.7 The result was dramatic annual increases in 
property taxes throughout California. 
On June 6, 1978, more than sixty-four percent of Califor-
nia's voters enacted California Constitution article XIIIA,8 
popularly known as Proposition 13. The Voters Pamphlet stated 
that Proposition 13 would limit property tax increases and cut 
government spending.9 
Proposition 13, publicized as a "tax revolt,"lO imposed se-
vere limitations upon the assessment and taxing powers of state 
and local government. As a result of the initiative, property tax 
revenues immediately dropped $5.9 billion, a fifty-one percent 
decrease from the previous year. 11 
ket value." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § l(a) 
"Fair market value" is defined in the Revenue and Tax Code as follows: 
"'[F)air market value' means the amount of cash or its 
equivalent which property would bring if exposed for sale in 
the open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor 
seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other and 
both with knowledge of all of the uses, and purposes to which 
the property is adapted and for which it is capable of being 
used and of the enforceable restrictions upon those uses and 
purposes." CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 110(a) (West 1972 & 
Supp. 1990). 
6. The assessed value of land and improvements reported by county assessors in-
creased from $43,187 million in 1969-70 to $90,394 million in 1977-78. Cal. State Board 
of Equalization, Annual Report 1977-78, at page A-4, table 4. 
7. State assessments increased from $2,880 mi1lion to $3,854 mi1lion in the same 
period. Id. 
8. California Voters Pamphlet, June 6, 1978, Statement of Vote (compiled by Cal. 
Secretary of State, Primary Election). 
9. California Voters Pamphlet, June 6, 1978 (compiled by Cal. Secretary of State) 
(comments by H. Jarvis, Chairman, United Org. of Taxpayers and P. Gann, President, 
Peoples Advocate). One of the initiative's co-authors, Howard Jarvis, stated that "[t)he 
objective .. .is to cut the cost of Government, and the only way left is to not give them 
the money in the first place." Fairbanks & Jarvis, Behr Measures Pit Owners Against 
Renters -Both Intended to Slow Tax Rise, L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1978 § 2, pt. 2, col. 1. 
10. G. KAUFMAN & K. ROSEN, THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT (1981), T. 
SCHWADRON & P. RICHTER, CALIFORNIA AND THE AMERICAN TAX RE-
VOLT (1984). 
11. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF PROPOSI-
TION 13 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (October 1979) (prepared by the California Legislative 
Analyst pursuant to Cal. S.B. No. 154, 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 292 (1978) and Cal. S.B. 2212. 
1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 332 (1978)) [hereinafter California Legislative Analyst). 
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B. STRUCTURE OF PROPOSITION 13 
Proposition 13 limits taxation in three ways. First, taxes are 
limited to one percent of a property's "full cash value.1Il2 Sec-
ond, the property's "full cash value" is fixed at its 1975 level, 
subject to an annual two percent inflationary increase. IS Lastly, 
a two-thirds. vote is required to raise any other taxes.H 
1. Percentage Limitation 
Section l(a) of Proposition 13 limits the maximum amount 
of any ad valorem11i tax to one percent of real property's "full 
cash value."16 Prior to the initiative, ad valorem taxes averaged 
2.7 percent of the full cash value of all taxable property in Cali-
fornia. 17 Thus the one percent limit substantially lowered real 
property taxes in the year it was enacted. 
Section l(b) of Proposition 13 lists two exceptions to this 
one percent limitation: pre-approved indebtedness, and new 
bonded indebtedness approved by two-thirds of the voters.18 
The pre-approved indebtedness exception allows government to 
increase taxes in order to pay debts incurred before Proposition 
13 was enacted. The other exception allows taxes to be increased 
if two thirds of the voters want to raise them. 
12. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1. 
13. [d. § 2. 
14. [d. §§ 3 & 4. 
15. Ad valorem is "a tax levied on property .. .in proportion to its value, as deter-
mined by assessment or appraisal." Black's Law Dictionary 48 (5th ed. 1979). 
16. "The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed 
one percent (1 %) of the full cash value of such property." CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 1(a) 
(1978, amended 1986). Full cash value is defined in § 2(a). 
17. California Voters Pamphlet 56, n. 7, June 6,1978 (compiled by Cal. Secretary of 
State) (comments by H. Jarvis, Chairman, United Org. of Taxpayers and P. Gann, Presi-
dent, Peoples Advocate). 
18. "The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem 
taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on (1) any in-
debtedness approved by the voters prior to July 1, 1978, or (2) any bonded indebtedness 
for the acquisition or improvement of real property approved on or after July 1, ~978, by 
two-thirds of the votes cast by the voters voting on the proposition." CAL. CONST. art. 
XIIIA § 1(b) (1978, amended 1986). 
3
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2. Value Limitation 
Section 2(a) of Proposition 13 provides two alternative defi-
nitions of the term "full cash value" used in section 1.19 Which 
definition applies depends on the acquisition date of the affected 
property. The full cash value of property acquired before March 
1, 1975 is based on the county assessor's valuation as shown on 
the 1975-76 tax bill.20 The full cash value of property aC<l,uired 
after March 1, 1975 is based on its appraised value when pur-
chased, newly constructed, or when a change in ownership has 
occured.21 
Section 2(b) of Proposition 13 allows an annual inflationary 
increase to the full cash value, up to a maximum of two 
percent.22 
3. "Super Majority" Vote Restriction 
Sections 3 and 4 of Proposition 13 require a two-thirds 
"super majority" vote in order to levy any new state or local tax· 
increases.23 The same sections also specifically forbid new ad 
valorem taxes on real property.24 Before Proposition 13 was en-
19. "Full cash value" is the county assessor's valuation of real property as shown on 
the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value" or, thereafter, the appraised value of real 
property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occured after 
the 1975 assessment. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 2(a) (1978, amended 1986). 
20. [d. 
21. A "change in ownership" includes the creation of a leasehold interest for a term 
of 35 years or more, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 61; and a corporate restructuring. Excep-
tions are granted for inter-family transfers, CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(g) and 2(h). 
22. "The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate not 
to exceed 2 percent for any given year .... "; CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b) (1978, 
amended 1986). 
23. "(A)ny changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing reve-
nues ... must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members 
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature .... " CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 3. 
"Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors 
of such district, may impose special taxes on such district .... " CAL. CONST. art. XnIA § 
4. 
24. "(N)o new (State) ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction 
taxes on the sales of real property may be imposed." CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3. 
"(A)d valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of 
real property within such City, County or special district (may not be imposed)." CAL. 
CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. 
4
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acted, voter approval was not required to increase local taxes,211 
and a simple majority vote was sufficient to raise state taxes.26 
By creating a "super majority" voting requirement, the drafters 
of Proposition 13 hoped to limit state and local government's 
ability to compensate for the loss of real property-related 
revenues.27 
C. JUDICIAL SOFTENING OF PROPOSITION 13 
Despite the limitations imposed by Proposition 13, state 
and local governments found ways to maintain and even increase 
gross revenues.28 This result has been attributed to the Califor-
nia courts' interpretation of the ambiguous29 language of Pro-
position 13.s0 
1. Laying The Groundwork: The Amador Decision 
Just months after Proposition 13 was enacted, various gov-
ernment agencies challenged the initiative on multiple constitu-
tional grounds.s1 The California Supreme Court upheld Proposi-
tion 13 in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization, but did so in a fashion that allowed 
later cases to soften the initiative's effect. 
The court in Amador stressed the limited nature of its in-
quiry, expressly reserving interpretation and application of par-
ticular provisions of the initiative for future litigation.32 This ju-
25. CAL. CONST. art. XI § 5 (homerule taxing authority); CAL. GOVN'T CODE § 37100.5 
(West 1988); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 7200-12 (West 1988); CAL. GOVN'T CODE § 37101 
(West 1988). 
26. [d. 
27. "[Tjhe initiative would restrict the ability of local governments to impose new 
taxes in order to replace the property tax revenue losses." California Voters Pamphlet 
60, Jun. 6, 1978 (compiled by Cal. Secretary of State) (Analysis by Legislative Analyst). 
28. State tax collections increased from $14.8 billion in 1977 to 35.6 billion in 1987-
88, Economic Report of the Governor, state of California at A-44, Table 35 (1989). 
29. The California Supreme Court termed the language of Proposition 13 "imprecise 
and ambiguous." Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 245, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 257 (1978). 
30. Henke & Woodlief, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on California 
Local Government Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251 (1988). 
31. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239. 
32. The court " ... examine[dj only those principal, fundamental challenges to the 
validity of article XIII A as a whole .... 'Analysis of the problems which may arise 
5
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dicial sidestepping left the door open for later challenges. This 
Comment will briefly discuss the ·more significant decisions in-
terpreting Proposition 13, in order to illustrate how California 
courts have softened the initiative's impact without eliminating 
it. 
2. Avoiding The One Percent Limitation 
a. Special Assessments 
California courts have restricted the taxes to which the one 
. percent limitation applies by distinguishing between "ad 
valorem tlixes" and "special assessments."ss Proposition 13 de-
fines neither term, but expressly limits only "ad valorem taxes". 
California courts define special assessments as charges to pay for 
local improvements which specifically benefit the affected prop-
erty, and define ad valorem taxes as "general" taxes designed to 
pay for general expenditures. S4 The courts have interpreted the 
reference to "special assessments" as exempting those charges 
from the one percent limitation. SCi 
The rationale for permitting special assessments is that they . 
allow local authorities flexibility in making improvements that 
owners are willing to pay for. Individual owners pay for the spe-
cial benefit they receive.s8 Courts have characterized street im-
provements, lighting improvements, irrigation improvements, 
respecting the interpretation or application of particular provisions of the act should be 
deferred for future cases in which those provisions are more directly challenged.''' 
Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241-
33. "[AJ special assessment was wholly different from an ad valorem tax, and there-
fore not within the one percent limitation." City Council u. South, 146 Cal. App. 3d 320, 
329, 194 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1983). The difference between "special assessments" and 
"ad valorem taxes" was analyzed in detail in Soluang Mun. Improuement Dist. u. Board 
of Superuisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 550-557 (1980), where the court concluded that "in 
spite of ambiguities encountered in practice, the basic distinction between general ad 
valorem taxation and special assessment to meet the cost of improvement remains rea-
sonably clear." Id at 553-54. 
34. South, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 328, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 116. 
35. " ... government entities which undertake local public improvements to benefit 
specified real property can finance such improvements by special assessments levied on 
the benefited property without regard to the 1 percent limitation on ad valorem real 
property taxes specified in section 1 of article XIIIA." Soluang, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 553-
554. 
36. "The general public should not be required to pay for special benefits for the 
few, and the few specially benefitted should not be subsidized by the general public." 
South, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 117. 
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sewer connections and drainage improvements as "special as-
sessments," thereby allowing them to escape Proposition 13's 
one percent limitation.37 By narrowly defining ad valorem taxes, 
courts have allowed California cities and utility districts to fi-
nance needed improvements by avoiding the one percent 
limitation. 
b. Pre-Approved Indebtedness 
Proposition 13 expressly provides for an "indebtedness" ex-
ception to the one percent limitation of section 1(a).38 By 
broadly defining the term "indebtedness"s9 to include, inter 
alia, retirement pension plans·o, water district maintenance con-
tracts·1, and a 1937 city charter provision requiring a tax for the 
support of the city's libraries42, courts have found another way 
to uphold taxes in excess of the one percent limitation. 
3. Two-Thirds Vote Requirement 
"Super majority" voting requirements such as the two-third 
vote required by se~tions 3 and ~ of Proposition 13 have long 
37. A special assessment for maintaining landscaped median islands on public 
streets levied in proportion to the benefit received by the parcel was not subject to the 
one percent limitation, South, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 117. 
A maintenance levy charged in proportion to the benefit received by each zone was 
not subject to the one percent limitation, American River Flood Control Dist. v. Sayre, 
136 Cal. App. 3d 347, 186 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1982). 
38. "The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem 
taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on . . . any 
indebtedness approved by the voters prior to July I, 1978 ... " CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, 
§ l(b) (emphasis added). 
39. "The critical consideration in determining whether a city has created an "in-
debtedness" under subdivision (b) is ... whether the voters obligated themselves prior 
to 1978 to make expenditures in the future for a specified purpose." Patton v. City of 
Alameda, 40 Cal.3d 41, 46, 706 P.2d 1135, 1138, 219 Cal. Rptr. I, 4 (1985). 
40. City of Watsonville v. Merrill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 185, 186 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1982); 
Valentine v. City of Oakland, 148 Cal. App. 3d 139, 196 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1983); Carman·v. 
Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 644 P.2d 192, 182 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1982) [all three cases held that 
a provision in the city's charter for pension plan contributions was "indebtedness" and 
thereby exempt from the one percent limitation of §1]. 
41. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Dorff, 138 Cal. App. 3d 388, 188 Cal. Rptr. 169 
(1982); Goodman v. County of Riverside, 140 Cal. App. 3d 900, 190 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1983) 
[both cases held that when voters approved water districts they approved an "indebted-
ness," allowing the issuance of general obligation bonds or an increase in local taxes 
exempt from §1]. 
42. Patton v. City of Alameda, 40 Cal. 3d 41, 706 P.2d 1135, 219 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). 
7
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been disfavored in California.48 Indeed, in 1970, the California 
Supreme Court held that a two-thirds voter approval require-
ment was an unconstitutional violation of equal protection." Al-
though the United States Supreme Court rejected this position 
and allowed a super majority voting requirement where no "dis-
crete and insular" majority has been singled out for special 
treatment40, the California Supreme Court continues to insist 
that super majority requirements be strictly construed and that 
ambiguities be resolved in favor of a simple majority!e Thus, 
many decisions interpreting Proposition 13 have permitted the 
adoption of new taxes by a simple majority vote!7 
Another method the courts have used to avoid the super 
majority vote requirement is to narrowly define the terms used 
in the initiatIve. Proposition 13 requires a two-thirds vote for 
"special taxes" imposed by cities, counties and "special dis-
triCts,"48 but fails to define the terms "special taxes" and "spe-
cial districts." California courts, however, have defined these 
terms so as to avoid the two-third voting requirement. "Special 
districts" are defined as only those districts which can levy taxes 
on real property.49 "Special taxes" are defined as only those 
taxes levied for a special purpose.oo In other words, the restric-
43. Henke & Woodlief, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on California 
Local Govn't Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251 (1988), at 271. 
44. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970) rev'd, 
403 U.S. 915 (1971) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 
1 (1970», cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). . 
45. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. I, 5 (1970). 
46. "In view of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the requirement for an 
extraordinary majority ... the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambi-
guities resolved in favor of permitting ... a majority, rather than a two-thirds vote." Los 
Angeles County Transp. Comm'n. v. Richmond, 31 Cal.3d 197, 205, 643 P.2d 941, 945, 
182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328 (1982). 
47. See, e.g., Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 
105; 695 P.2d 220, 222; 211 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135 (1985) [upholding special district tax 
without two-thirds voter approval]; City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 
3d 47, 52; 648 P.2d 935, 937-8; 184 Cal. Rptr. 713,715-16 (1982) [the language of section 
4 must be strictly construed. . .so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds re-
quirement applies]; Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 208, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330 
(1982) [upholding transportation district sales tax even though only 54 percent of the 
voters approved it); Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 
170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 691 (1981) [upholding school facilities fees without voter approval). 
48. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. 
49. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
50. Farrell, 32 Cal.3d 47, 648 P.2d 935; 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982) [a two-thirds vote 
is not required for taxes that go into a general fund] 
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tions of Proposition 13's super majority requirement can be 
"readily and completely avoided by the simple creation of a dis-
trict which is geographically precisely coterminous to a county, 
but which lacks its real property taxing power."lIl 
4. Summary 
The decisions interpreting Proposition 13 have helped state 
and local governments maintain their revenue base, despite the 
initiative. In the words of one commentator, "California courts 
have construed the taxing restrictions of Proposition· 13 nar-
rowly, allowing local governments room to develop nonproperty 
tax revenue sources to replace revenue losses caused by proposi-
tion 13."112 As a result of narrow judicial interpretation of the 
initiative, the drastic reductions in critical services feared by 
Proposition 13's opponentsll3 have not occured. 
On the other hand, despite these judicially created "loop-
holes" the average property owner in California still pays sub-
stantially less in property taxes than he or she would pay in the 
absence of Proposition 13.11• Thus, it appears that both the spirit 
of the initiative, and essential government services, have been 
maintained by delicate judicial balancing of the opposing 
interests. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Amador Valley Joint Union High School v. State Board of 
Equalization lill was the first case to address an equal protection 
challenge to Proposition 13. Although a majority of the Califor-
51. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 213, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333. 
52. Henke & Woodlief, The Effect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on California 
Local Government Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251, 253·54 (1988). 
53. California Voters Pamphlet 58-59, Jun. 6, 1978 (compiled by Cal. Secretary of 
State) (comments by H. Jarvis, Chairman, United Org. of Taxpayers and P. Gann, Presi-
dent, Peoples Advocate). 
54. The statewide average tax rate on real and tangible personal property dropped 
from $11.19 per $100 assessed valuation in 1976-77 to $1.083 per $100 assessed value in 
1986-87 as a result of Proposition 13. Cal. State Board of Equalization, Annual Reports 
1977-78 and 1987-88, at page A-4, table 4. 
55. 22 Clll. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). 
9
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nia Supreme Court in Amador held that equal protection had 
not been violated, Justice Bird's dissent pointed out many of the 
same inequities that would later trouble the United States Su-
preme Court in Allegheny. Noting that §2(a)'s definition of "full 
cash value" effectively divides the property tax-paying public 
into two classes (pre- and post-1975 purchasers)1I6 Justice Bird 
argued that Proposition 13 creates an environment where two 
substantially identical homes, sitting side by side and receiving 
identical government services, are assessed and taxed at differ-
ent levels depending on their date of acquisition.1I7. Because of 
rapid inflation in ho~e prices over the past decade,1I8 §2(a) cre-
ates a wide disparity in tax treatment for similar properties.1I9 
This disparity, the Amador dissent argues, violates Equal Pro-
tection requirements . 
. Most of the equal protection challenges to property taxation 
systems have failed60 because of the heavy burden imposed on 
56. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 250, 583 P.2d at 1303, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 261. 
57. Justice Bird used the following hypothetical to illustrate her point: 
"John and Mary Smith live next door to Tom and Sue Jones. 
Their houses and lots are identical with current market values 
of $80,000. The .Smiths bought their home in January of 1975 
when the market value was $40,000. The Joneses bought their 
home in 1977 when the market value was $60,000. In 1977, 
both homes were assessed at $60,000, and both couples paid 
the same amount of property tax. However, under article 
XIIIA in 1978, the Joneses will pay 150 percent of the taxes 
that the Smiths will pay. Should a third couple buy the 
Smiths' home in 1978, that couple would pay twice the taxes 
that the Smiths would have paid for the same home had they 
not sold it." 
Amador, 22 CaL3d at 249, 149 Cal. Rptr. 260-61. 
58. The assessed value of land and improvements reported by county assessors in-
creased from 95,453 miJIion dollars in 1978-79 to 1,151,588 in 1988-89. Cal. State Board 
of Equalization, Annual Report 1987-88 at page A-4, Table 4. 
59. The owner of a property acquired in 1975 for $30,000 wiJI pay approximately 
$385 in taxes during 1989 (1 % of $30,000 plus 2% increase per year allowed by § 2(b)). 
The same property in 1989 will cost approximately $300,000; and the new owner's prop-
erty tax liability will be approximately $3,000 per year (1 % of purchase price), almost 
seven times higher than taxes for a property acquired in 1975. 
60. Louisville Trust "Co. v. Stone, 107 F. 305 (6th Cir. 1901) [court would not enjoin 
state's assessment of challenger's property at full cash value, even though other property 
was assessed at only seventy percent of full cash value]. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S. Ct. 437 (1959) [tax on resident corporation's stored merchan-
dise, while nonresident corporation was exempt, did not violate equal protection]; Kahn 
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S. Ct. 1734,40 L. Ed.2d 189 (1974) [tax exemption granted to 
widows but denied to widowers did not violate equal protection]. 
10
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the challenger of an economic regulation.61 There have been suc-
cessful challenges; however,62 which are useful in predicting the 
outcome of an attack on Proposition 13. 
B. THE Amador DECISION 
As stated above, the constitutionality of Proposition 13 was 
first addressed by the California Supreme Court in the Amador 
case.63 Various government agencies challenged the three-
month-old initiative on seven separate constitutional grounds.6• 
The court specifically considered and rejected each argument, 
including one based on the California Constitution's equal pro-
tection clause. In reaching its decision, the Amador court noted 
that it had a "solemn duty to jealously guard the initiative 
power" as "one of the most precious rights of our democratic 
process."611 It accordingly resolved all doubts in favor of the 
initiative. 
The Amador court used mere "rational basis" scrutiny in its 
constitutional analysis, and gave as its justification: 
61. "[S]tates have broad powers to impose and collect taxes. A state may divide 
different kinds of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden." 
Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 638. 
62. Royster Guano Co. Ii. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415; 40 S. Ct. 560; 649 L.Ed 989, 
991 (1920) [charging different taxes for nonresident and resident corporations constitutes 
arbitrary discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment]. 
63. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). 
64. The Amador court concluded that Proposition 13 " ... survives each of the seri-
ous and substantial constitutional attacks .... " [d. at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. at 241. The Amador court resolved each of the constitutional attacks by holding 
that Proposition 13: 
(l)is an amendment to the state Constitution (which may be accomplished by initiative), 
rather than a revision (which requires a constitutional convention or legislative action), 
id. at 221, 583 P.2d at 1284-85, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43. 
(2)does not violate the single-subject requirement of the initiative process, id. at 229-30, 
583 P.2d at 1289-90, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48; 
(3)does not violate equal protection requirements, id. at 233, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. at 250; 
(4)does not deny the right to travel, id. at 237-38,583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253; 
(5)does not impair municipalities' contractual rights, id. at 238-42, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 
Cal. Rptr. at 253-55; 
(6)does not violate the title and ballot summary requirements for initiatives required by 
the California Constitution, id. at 242-44, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57; and 
(7)is not so vague as to be void and inoperable, since it could be judicially interpreted, 
id. at 244-47,583 P.2d at 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257-59. 
65. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 248, 583 P.2d at 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. 
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"We have long held that 'where taxation is con-
cerned and no specific federal right, apart from 
equal protection, is imperiled, the States have 
large leeway in making classifications and drawing 
lines which in their judgment produce reasonable 
systems of taxation. [S]o long as a system of taxa-
tion is supported by a rational basis, and is not 
palpably arbitrary, it will be upheld despite the 
absence of a precise scientific uniformity .... "66 
The Amador court noted that under Proposition 13, taxes 
for the two classes, pre- and post-1975 purchasers, are based on 
each buyer's free and voluntary act of purchase.67 Concluding 
that any tax inequalities created by Proposition 13 bear a ra-
tional relationship to purchase price and thus are not wholly ar-
bitrary or irrational, the court upheld Proposition 13.68 
The court found further support for its decision to uphold 
Proposition 13 in the theory underlying sales tax systems.69 
Sales tax on personal property is based on the purchase price of 
the good. Since the tax can vary substantially for identical items 
depending on the price paid, the Amador court felt this was 
analagous to the method of assessment created by Proposition 
13. 
As a result of the Amador decision, Proposition 13's consti-
tutionality went without serious challenge until more than ten 
years later, when the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Allegheny. Since Allegheny, three cases have chal-
lenged Proposition 13 on equal protection grounds.70 
These three equal protection challenges to Proposition 13 
brought within a year of Allegheny demonstrate its significance 
66. Id. at 233·34, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250·51, citing Kahn u. Sheuin, 
416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). 
67. Id. at 235, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251. 
68. Id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252. 
69. Id. at 235·36, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252. 
70. Northwest Financial Inc. u. Board of Equalization and County of San Diego, 
Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, No. 611092, filed 4/12/89; Nordlinger u. Lynch, Cal. 
Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, No. C·738781, filed 9/28/89; and R.H. Macy & Co., Inc. 
u. Contra Costa County, Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa County, No. C 89·04568. Although 
the Superior Court upheld Proposition 13 in the two cases that have had hearings as of 
March 6, 1990, these decisions are expected to be challenged on appeal. 
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to the future of taxes in California. These cases are now making 
their way through the courts. Anyone of them could result in 
drastic changes or an invalidation of the initiative. Careful anal-
ysis of the Allegheny decision would be helpful in predicting the 
ultimate outcome of these challenges. 
C. THE Allegheny DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court held in the Allegheny case71 
that a tax system which created "dramatic differences in valua-
tion"72 for comparable property was unconstitutional because it 
denied recent purchasers equal protection of the law.7s 
In Allegheny, the taxing authority of West Virginia had 
been assessing real property on the basis of its recent purchase 
price, while making only minor modifications in the assessments 
of land which had not been recently sold.'" The Allegheny Court 
found the practice unconstitutional, noting that "the constitu-
tional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property 
owners. "711 
The Allegheny Court claims to have used "rational basis" 
scrutiny to overturn Webster County's taxation system. Well-
settled principles of constitutional law dictate that this minimal 
scrutiny be applied to economic regulations.76 
Since any conceivable reason for upholding the legislation is 
generally sufficient to meet the rational basis test," virtually 
every challenge to a taxation system' should fail. Despite this, 
the Court in Allegheny overturned the Webster County assesl:!-
ment practices. This is consistent with a modern trend favoring 
71. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. u. County Commission of Webster County, West 
Virginia, 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989). 
72. The Allegheny plaintiffs were taxed at 8 - 35 times the rate applied to owners of 
comparable properties, Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 637. 
73. Id. at 635. 
74. Assessed values of property that had not been recently conveyed were increased 
ten percent in the years 1976, 1982, and 1984, In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against 
Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560 (1987). 
75. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 638. 
76. See GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, H·ed., pages 593-596. 
77. Allied Stores of Ohio u. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959). 
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a more penetrating "rational basis" review.78 
A number of issues are relevant in determining how much 
"bite"79 the scrutiny used by the court actually has. Why did the 
Allegheny Court even reach the federal constitutional issue 
when it could have overruled the assessment method by looking 
exclusively to the state constitution? Did the challengers really 
have the burden of proof? If the Constitution requires the "sea-
sonable attainment" of a "rough equality" in tax treatment,80 
how are these terms defined by the Court? 
a. Did the Court use a More Penetrating Rational Basis 
Scrutiny?" 
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has given 
great deference to legislative clas!)ifications which infringe on 
purely economic rights, requiring only that there be a "rational 
basis" underlying the classification.81 Under "rational basis" 
scrutiny, any conceivable argument to uphold a classification 
would be sufficient to meet the demands of equal protection.82 
Since it eliminates the need for proving legislative intent, a ra-
tional basis test simplifies the government's burden in defending 
against an equal protection attack. 
Claiming to use the rational basis test, the Allegheny Court 
rejected Webster County's arguments,88 even though they 
78. "In the early and mid-1980's; the Burger Court was sometimes less willing to 
apply the conceivable basis test. ... While invoking the "rational basis" standard, the 
Court's inquiry sometimes took on a 'new, more penetrating character." TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2nd Ed., 1444 (1988). The Supreme Court has recently used ra-
tional basis review to strike down economic legislation, Zobel u. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 
(1982), Hooper u. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985). 
79. A noted commentator has argued for "a new bite for the old equal protection," 
Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
80. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. u. County Commission of Webster County, West 
Virginia, 109 S.Ct. 633, 638. (1989). 
81. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d Ed, §16-2, 1439-40 (1988). 
82. "Here the discrimination against residents is not invidious nor palpably arbi-
trary because ... it rests ... upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceiued to 
constitute a distinction ... which the state is prohibited from seperately classifying." Al-
lied Stores of Ohio u. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (emphasis added). 
83. The County argued that its assessment scheme was rationally related to its pur-
pose of assessing properties at true current value. It noted that the purchase price of 
property was exceedingly accurate information about its market value. Allegheny, 109 S. 
Ct. at 637. 
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presented a "conceivable" justification for the taxation method. 
In reality the Allegheny Court articulated a more stringent and 
result-oriented test: "the constitutional requirement is the sea-
sonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of simi-
larly situated property owners."8. If the language of Allegheny is 
to be taken literally, a tax plan that does not achieve equality in 
a "seasonable" time is unconstitutional. This demanding stan-
dard establishes a level of scrutiny far above the traditional "ra-
tional basis"· test, despite the Court's characterization to the 
contrary. I would therefore conclude that the Allegheny court 
reviewed Webster County's taxation method using what has 
been called "rational basis with bite."811 
b. Discussion of the Federal Violations 
The Allegheny Court could have rested its decision on its 
holding that the Webster County taxation scheme violated the 
state constitution's requirement for uniform taxation throughout 
the state.8S Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unani-
mous court, discussed how the assessment method violated the 
Federal Constitution.87 By doing so, the Court left the door open 
for subsequent constitutional challenges to Proposition 13. Any 
attempt at determining why the Court did this would be specu-
lative, but it may be significant that they did so. 
c. Burden of proof 
After Allegheny, the constitutionality of an assessment 
method is determined by comparing tax bills. Once the plaintiff 
establishes that taxes for property in the same class have been 
unequal for an unseasonable time, the burden shifts to the tax-
ing authority to prove the plan is constitutional. 
This placement of the burden of proof is a significant 
change from the analysis used by the Amador court when it up-
84. Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 638, citing Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 
526-527, 79 S. Ct. 437, 440-441 (1959). 
85. See supra, note 79. 
86. "The West Virginia Constitution guarantees to its citizens that, with certain ex-
ceptions, 'taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State ... .''' Allegheny, 
109 S. Ct. 635, citing W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
87. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 637. 
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held Proposition 13. There the California Supreme Court 
showed great deference to the people's use of the initiative 
power, resolving all doubts in favor of Proposition 13.88 If a more 
searching rational basis scrutiny is indeed now being used to re-
view economic regulations, Proposition 13 might very well be 
found unconstitutional. 
d. Other Issues 
A number of issues remain unresolved under the Allegheny 
test. First, the Court does not explain how long "seasonable" is. 
In Allegheny, the assessment inequities they held unconstitu-
tional had lasted for ten years. Since Proposition 13 has' been 
creating assessment disparities for a longer time, and has no 
mechanism for equalizing taxes over time, it appears to violate 
the Allegheny Court's interpretation of "seasonable." 
The second issue is how much of a difference in taxes does 
"rough equality" allow? The Allegheny Court rejected a scheme 
where the difference was 8 - 35 times higher.8D The inequities in 
California may not be as dramatic, but their impact is still sig~ 
nificant. DO The California courts must determine whether a 
"rough equality" would allow one owner to pay over three times 
as much as his similarly situated neighbor. 
Another issue that should be considered is how "similarly 
situated" is defined. Classifications based on a reasonable differ-
ence between the two groups are allowable. The Allegheny 
Court approvingly cited as examples the differences between . 
corporations and individuals, or different trades and professions. 
However, these examples are quite different from a classification 
based on the date of a property's purchase. California courts 
must determine whether neighbors who purchase their homes at 
different times are "similarly-situated." 
If the California courts follow the Allegheny test, the propo-
88. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. 01 Equalization, 22 
Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978). 
89. Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. at 638. 
90. A statistical study was recently made in Contra Costa County to determine the 
magnitude of the inequities. The average ratio of disparities in the county for the 1975 
base year properties was 3.2:1 in 1987. 
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nents of Proposition 13 will have a heavy burden to overcome. 
This is a complete reversal of the burden of proof in Amador, 
where all presumptions favored the initiative. As a result Pro-
position 13 is unlikely to survive a constitutional attack without 
a revision to the section which creates the inequities. 
D. THE Krugman DECISION 
In Krugman v. Board of Assessors,S1 a pre-Allegheny New 
York Supreme Court case, a homeowner sought a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the assessment practices of the Village of 
Atlantic Beach, New York. Like the taxing schemes at issue in 
Allegheny and Amador, Atlantic Beach was assessing real prop-
erty upon transfer, while making only minor value increases in 
property that had not recently been sold. The New York Appel-
late Division vacated the assessment, holding that "the selective 
reassessment of real property upon a transfer thereof violates 
the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitu-
tion."s2 Atlantic Beach filed an appeal but abandoned it after 
Allegheny.ss The Village has since refunded the taxes to the 
Krugman homeowners with interest. S4 
The Krugman court noted that disparate tax treatment 
based on a property's acquisition date "permits property owners 
who have been longstanding recipients of public amenities to 
bear the least amount of their cost."SIi According to the Krug-
man court: 
"It would appear that the sole purpose of the dif-
ferent classes is to serve administrative conve-
nience by relieving the village of the burden of 
conducting a total annual review of the tax roll 
and instead permitting a piecemeal approach to 
reassessment. This approach lacks any rational 
basis in law and results in invidious discrimina-
91. 533 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1988). 
92. Krugman, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 497. 
93. Appeal dismissed in Krugman I). Board of Assessors of The Village of Atlantic 
Beach, 73 N.Y.2d 872, 537 N.Y.S.2d 498, 534 N.E.2d 336 (1989). 
94. Mr. Krugman obtained a refund of $1,640.09 for overpaid taxes and interest. 
The Village also refunded $13,138.50 to six other homeowners represented by Krugman's 
attorney. Shaman, Courts Addressing Assessments Inequities, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 
1989. 
95. Krugman, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 501. 
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tion between owners of similarly situated prop-
erty. Thus, the respondents' method of reassess-
ment violates the equal protection clause 
of ... the United States Constitution."96 
A recent New York Times article speculated that the Krug-
man and Allegheny decisions could mean the rollback of assess-
ments for hundreds of new property owners in New York, and 
higher assessments for longtime residents,97 as local government 
tries to equalize the taxes. 
The Krugman decision is significant since it adds to the 
weight of authority against a Proposition 13-style tax scheme. 
The analysis used in Krugman closely parallels that used by the 
Supreme Court in Allegheny three months later. The taxation 
system used .in New York closely parallels the California system 
established by Proposition 13. Since both these cases dealt with 
almost identical factual situations, the fact that Krugman over-
turned the taxation system using a less stringent test than the 
Allegheny court highlights the fact that the Allegheny Court 
went further than was necessary to overturn the taxation 
method they were reviewing. It is conceivable that the Court was 
laying the groundwork for a challenge to Proposition 13. Cer-
tainly the precedent established by Allegheny creates a difficult 
burden for the California taxing authority to overcome. 
E. HARMONIZING THE DECISIONS 
The assessment methods sucessfully challenged in Alle-
gheny and Krugman are virtually identical to the method estab-
lished by Proposition 13, which Amador held .to be constitu-
tional. The Allegheny Court expressly noted that Proposition 13 
was similar to the scheme it was striking down, but declined to 
determine if such a method would survive an equal protection 
attack if it were the general law of the state, as it is in Califor-
nia.98 All three systems assessed recently transferred real prop-
96. [d. 
97. Shaman, Courts Addressing Assessment Inequities, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989. 
98. "We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment 
method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, 
instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be. The State of California 
has adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its Constitution .... The system is 
18
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erty at substantially higher rates than properties not recently 
sold, thereby creating a wide discrepancy in taxes. Both the 
Krugman and Allegheny courts held that this violated the equal 
protection clause of the federal constitution. The California Su-
preme Court in Amador looked at the same basic assessment 
method. and only found it constitutional after weighing the 
scales very heavily in favor of the tax scheme. In order to predict 
the outcome of a challenge to Proposition 13 after Allegheny, it 
is necessary to harmonize these contradictory results. 
The Supreme Court itself suggests one possible way to har-
monize the Allegheny decision with Proposition 13.99 Califor-
nia's method of assessment has been specifically established as a 
state law, while the Krugman and Allegheny assessors were vio-
lating the New YorklOO and West VirginialOl constitutions, re-
spectively. It seems doubtful that this distinction is sufficient to 
save Proposition 13; however, since the Supreme Court also 
stated in the same opinion that this method of assessment vio-
lated the federal constitution. lOll Thus even ~f the assessment 
method does not violate state law, a challenger to Proposition 13 
can argue that under Allegheny it violates the federal 
constitution. 
A better explanation for the different holdings is the appar-
ently differing levels of scrutiny applied by the courts reviewing 
the taxation methods. The Amador court upheld Proposition 13 
by noting that it was the court's "solemn duty to jealously guard 
the initiative power as being one of the most precious rights of 
our democratic process."10B The court also stated that "if doubts 
reasonably can be resolved in favor of the use of the initiative, 
we should so resolve them. "104 Plainly the burden in Amador 
grounded on the belief that taxes should be based on the original cost of property and 
should not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of property. "Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 
638, note 4. 
99.Id. 
100. "The legislature shall provide for the ... equalization of assessments for pur-
poses of taxation," N.Y. CaNST. art. XVI, § 2. 
101. ". , .[TJaxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state," W. VA 
CaNST. art. X, § 1. 
102. 'Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. 633, 637. (1989). (emphasis added). 
103. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, citing Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 
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was on the challengers to the taxation scheme. The Amador 
court itself made it clear that a close question was being decided 
when it admitted that it was reserving judgment on some "un-
resolved uncertainties"lOIl and that it was presenting "an argua-
bly reasonable basis for assessment. "l06 This language is consis-
tent with a more traditional rational basis scrutiny level, which 
only requires a "conceivable" reason to uphold the challenged 
classification. 
In sharp contrast is the test stated in Allegheny: "In each 
case, the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attain-
ment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated 
property owners."107 Under this standard the challenger still has 
the initial burden of establishing inequality, but this. can be met 
quite easily by putting the public tax roll into evidence. The 
burden then shifts to the taxing authority to establish that the 
challenged tax method will seasonably correct these inequities. 
If it does not, it fails the Allegheny test and thus violates the 
equal protection mandate. The test as articulated does not allow 
the taxing authority to justify the inequality. Once it has been 
established that similarly situated property is being taxed un~ 
equally, the disparity must be corrected. This is clearly tougher 
than the traditional rational basis scrutiny used by the Amador 
court. 
If the different results reached by the decisions are caused 
by a modern, more searching level of review, then a challenge to 
Proposition 13 should succeed under the new standard. What 
becomes the deciding issue is where the court focuses its atten-
tion. If the challenger must prove that no rational basis for the 
assessment method exists, Proposition 13 should be found con-
stitutional as it was in Amador. If instead the government is re-
quired to show that taxes are roughly equal, Proposition 13 must 
be held unconstitutional under the Allegheny test. 
105. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241. 
106. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 235; 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (emphasis 
added). 
107. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. u. County Commission of Webster County, 
West Virginia, 109 S. Ct. at 638. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR & AGAINST PROPOSITION 13 
An analysis of the arguments for and against Proposition 13 
provides insight into the possible outcome of a constitutional 
challenge to the initiative. There are persuasive arguments on 
both sides of the issue. It is important to note; however, that a 
balancing of interests is not part of traditional rational basis 
analysis. The arguments in favor of Proposition 13 merely point 
out that it would be difficult to assert that no rational basis for 
the initiative exists. There are certainly some conceivable rea-
sons to uphold Proposition 13. Thus under an Amador -type 
analysis the taxation system could be upheld. 
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF UPHOLDING PROPOSITION 13 
1. Predictability 
One argument in favor of Proposition 13's validity was ana-
lyzed in Amador and acknowledged by the United States Su-
preme Court in Allegheny.lo8 Under the "acquisition value" ap-
proachlo9 to taxation established by Proposition 13, taxes bear a 
"rational relationship" to the price a buyer is willing and able to 
pay for property.110 Because of Proposition 13, property owners 
can estimate their future tax liability with some assurance. The 
Allegheny Court noted that Proposition 13 is grounded in the 
belief that owners should not be taxed on unrealized paper gains 
in the value of their property.lll 
Although Proposition 13 admittedly creates inequities, the 
initiative has accomplished its purpose of providing real prop-
erty tax relief. Initially it lowered taxes for all homeowners from 
an effective rate of 2.7 percent to 1.1 percent. Proposition 13 
then kept taxes affordable despite rapid appreciation in real 
property in the last decade.ll2 The benefits of Proposition 13 can 
108. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 638, n. 4. 
109. Amador, 22 Cal.3d at 235; 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251. 
110. "This 'acquisition value' approach to taxation finds reasonable support in a 
theory that the annual taxes which a property owner must pay should bear some rational 
relationship to the original cost of the property, rather than relate to' an unforeseen, 
perhaps unduly inflated, current value, id. at 235, 583 P.2d at 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251. 
111. Allegheny, 109 S.Ct. 633, 638, n. 4. 
112. In the last decade the aggregate assessed value of all land in California in-
creased from $95,453 million dollars in 1978-79 to $1,151,588 million dollars in 1988-89. 
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best be seen by comparing taxes in California to other jurisdic-
tions lacking similar protection. Many other stat"es are only now 
considering legislation similar to Proposition 13. In the New 
York/ New Jersey metropolitan area, sudden, dramatic increases 
in tax assessmentsll8 have property owners in active revolt.1l4 
2. Proposition 13 Spreads the Tax Burden 
Another argument in support of Proposition 13 is that the 
initiative spreads the overall tax burden more equitably than do 
systems without property tax limitations. Under Proposition 13, 
local governments cannot collect needed revenues by raising 
property taxes, so they must obtain funding from other sources. 
The cost of services, borne disproportionately by homeowners in 
the absence of Proposition 13-type legislation, is now spread 
over a larger group of all wage earners, renters, and owners of 
property. A broader tax base in turn allows for a lower tax per 
person. 
3. Will of the People 
Proposition 13 is also supported by the argument that the 
initiative is "the 'will of the people." It was enacted by an over-
whelming majority of the voters. I III Presumably', these voters 
were aware that unequal tax treatment would result, since the 
ballot arguments clearly stated that "two identical properties 
with the same market value could have different assessed values 
for tax purposes if one of them has been sold since March 1, 
CAL. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1987-88 at page A-4, Table 4. 
113. Westchester County, NY predicted a 9% increase in 1989, New York Times, 
Dec. 25, 1988, §XXII, 1:5; Nassau County, NY predicted a 12% increase in 1989, New 
York Times, Nov. IS, 1988, §II, 2:4; Suffolk County, NY proposed a 15% increase in 
1989, New York Times, Oct. 9,1988, §XXI, 1:4; New York City co-op and condominium 
owners faced 20% increases in taxes in 1989, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1989, §I, 29:2. These 
statistics emphasis the benefits of Proposition 13's limitations on taxes. 
114. On March 14, 1989 in Hauppauge, NY more than 700 residents, irate over ris-
ing taxes, packed the Suffolk County legislative chambers to demand a rollback of prop-
erty tax increases. One local politician noted "I knew they would be angry, but there was 
almost a sense of violence out there tonight." Homeowners complained that their chil-
dren had to move out of state in order to be able to afford a home. Speakers at the 
hearing stated" We fear being unable to live here, we fear being unable to pay our 
bills. . . You must heed the growing tide, the tide of a tax revolt." Schmitt, Suffolk 
Property Owners Demand Tax Reductions, N.Y. Times, March 14, 1989, §II, 2:4. 
115. See supra, note 8 and accompanying text. 
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1975,"U6 and "[h]omeowners living in identical side-by-side 
houses will pay vastly different property tax bills."117 
Continuing voter support for Proposition 13 is evidenced by 
subsequent tax-related initiative measures. In 1986, the Califor-
nia voters enacted Proposition 62, which requires a two-thirds 
vote of the local governing body to impose a general fund tax. us 
A recently proposed initiative which would have raised Proposi-
tion 13's one percent limitation to 2.2 percent for commercial 
properties failed to get the number of signatures required to put 
it on the ballot. 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSITION 13 
There are a number of arguments that could be advanced to 
overrule Proposition 13. Again, it must be noted that these will 
not be considered by a court using the traditional rational basis 
test, since any reason in favor of the law will be sufficient to 
meet that standard. If, instead, a more searching test is used be-
cause of Allegheny, the court may balance the equities by weigh-
ing the arguments on both sides of the issues. If this occurs ar-
guments against the initiative might carry significant weight in 
the court's decision. 
1. Inherent Unfairness 
Opponents of Proposition 13 argue that there is no reason 
why long time owners should pay lower taxes than recent pur-
chasers. The court in Krugman noted that the practice of assess-
ing only newly transferred properties at market value has the 
effect of permitting property owners who have been longstand-
ing recipients of public amenities to bear the least amount of 
their cost.U9 This is true of the system established by Proposi-
tion 13 as well. 
116. California Voters Pamphlet, 59, June 6, 1978, Journal Ballot Proposition Anal· 
ysis, note 3, (Analysis by Legislative Analyst). 
117. I d., Arguments Against Proposition 13. 
118. Cal. Initiative Proposition No.62 (Nov 4, 1986), codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 
53720·30 (West 1983 & Supp 1990). 
119. Krugman, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 501. 
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2. The Plight of the First-Time Homebuyer 
The difficulties facing home buyers in 1990 are much 
greater than they were in 1976. The price of property in most 
California cities has risen faster than salaries, putting the 
purchase of a home beyond the means of most potential first-
time home buyers.120 Proposition 13 exacerbates the problem by 
imposing a disproportionate share of California's tax burden on 
recent purchasers. The initiative could put the purchase of a 
home further out of reach for many first time homebuyers be-
cause their taxes must subsidize their neighbors. Justice Bird, in 
her Amador dissent, recognized this problem twelve years ago: 
"the higher mortgage payments that new homeowners pay as 
compared to earlier purchasers forewarns us against any cavalier 
assumption that later purchasers are able to bear heavier 
taxes. 11121 
The value of these opposing arguments in allowing one to 
predict the outcome of a constitutional challenge is minimal 
however, since a balancing test allows each judge considerable 
discretion in determining which way the scales tip. They are 
presented in this note to allow the reader to begin considering 
the issues as a first step towards drawing their own conclusions. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Introduction 
The justifications for Proposition 13 referred to in Amador 
and Allegheny are commendable. The two interests advanced, 
enabling property owners to accurately estimate their future tax 
liabilities and preventing the taxation of unrealized paper gains 
in property values, seem to establish rational state interests 
which should be sufficient to uphold the initiative. This should 
not end the constitutional inquiry; however, since the equal pro-
tection test has both a "means" and "ends" branch. Where less 
120. The assessed value of property has in"creased from $95,543 million dollars in 
1979 to $1,151,588 million dollars in 1989; more than a thousand percent increase. Cal. 
State Board of Equalization, Annual Report 1988-89, at page A-4, table 4. 
Salaries have not kept pace with this rapid appreciation. 
121. Amador Valley Join( Union High Sch. Dist. u. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 
Cal. 3d 208, 255, 583 P.2d 1281, 1306-1307, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 264 (1978). 
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restrictive ways to accomplish these goals exist, the use of a 
more searching rational basis test might find the initiative 
unconstitutional. 
2. Recommendations 
The inequities of Proposition 13 could be eliminated with-
out affecting voter expectations. The protections afforded by the 
one percent limit of Section 1 and by the two-thirds voting re-
quirements of Sections 3 and 4 could still stand,122 government 
spending could still be restricted, and all arguments in favor of 
the initiative could still be met without imposing disproportion-
ate tax burdens, simply by modifying the language of Section 2 
which creates the different classes of taxpayers. 
a. Raise All Assessments to 1990 Levels 
One way to equalize taxes would be to define full cash value 
as current market value. Local government could reassess prop-
erty and raise taxes annually. Neighboring property owners 
would then pay taxes based on the property's value, not its date 
of acquisition. It should be noted that raising assessments is not 
a remedy which can be forced on an aggrieved taxpayer. It has 
long been held, and was reasserted by the Court in AlleghenyU 8 
that "the constitutional requirement. . . is not satisfied if a 
state. . . imposes on [the taxpayer] the burden of seeking an up-
ward revision of the taxes of other members of the class.1Il24 One 
problem with this approach is that government revenue would 
substantially increase as a result, thereby thwarting the inten-
tion of the voters in enacting Proposition 13. 
Reassessing all property at 1990 market values could also' 
prompt an increase in foreclosures. Most home owners borrow to 
their credit limit, hoping to take advantage of continued equity 
growth. In addition, financing homes with variable rate mort-
gages has become a growing trend. Monthly payments under this 
122. Proposition 13 allows for the severance of any unconstitutional section without 
affecting the whole, Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 6. 
123. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 639. 
124. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445-57 (1923), Hillsbor-
ough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). 
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form of financing increase as interest rates go up. A tax increase 
of even a few hundred dollars a month could cause borrowers 
using variable rate financing to go into default, especially if in-
terest rates had increased as well. 
Higher taxes would also lower the price of homes. Buyers 
must consider the total monthly cost of financing, insurance, 
and taxes when budgeting a purchase price. Higher taxes would 
make less money available for mortgage payments, would lower 
the demand for homes, and would thereby lower home prices. 
Lower home prices could in turn stagnate the home building 
market, cause a state-wide recession. As worker/homeowners be-
gan losing their jobs, still more foreclosures could result. 
A number of solutions could alleviate these problems. The 
tax increases could be phased in over a period of from five to ten 
years. Special provisions, like tax exemptions or government 
subsidies, could be made for elderly and low-income homeown-
ers so that these particularly susceptible classes of homeowners 
would not be forced out of their homes. A tax "payment cap," 
which places a ceiling on a homeowner's yearly payments, could 
also help to avert foreclosures. Any accrued but unpaid taxes 
under such a scheme would not be due until the affected prop-
erty was sold or transferred. 
b. Lower All Assessments to 1976 Levels 
A second alternative, assessing all property a~ 1976 levels, 
could have a disastrous effect on governmental financing. When 
Proposition 13 was enacted in 1978, municipalities had to find 
creative ways around the initiative in order to make up for an 
estimated $6 billion in lost revenues. Subsequent initiatives have 
since closed many of these loopholes, making it difficult for state 
and local government to replace the losses. 
The cost of providing government services has continued to 
increase since 1976. By reassessing property at 1976 levels, a tax-
payer who benefits from an unnaturally low 1976 tax rate would 
nonetheless continue to expect 1990 services. The expectation is 
unrealistic in light of modern costs. 
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c. Base All Assessments on a Median Value 
A third option would be to equalize assessments by fixing 
them at some median date so that pre-1975 residents would pay 
a little more and recent purchasers would pay a little less than 
they currently pay under Proposition 13. If the volume of home 
sales has been consistent over the past decade, a date midway 
between the 1976 and,1989 assessments would be the logical 
choice. All property bought before 1976 would accordingly be as-
sessed at its 1983 value, and then adjusted to 1990 values using 
the inflation factor of Section 2(b). 
With appreciation in home values running at up to thirty 
percent, Section 2(b)'s two percent annual inflation adjustment 
will have to be increased under this option. Statistical studies 
would be necessary to determine a percentage that could main-
tain the requisite "rough equality" over time. One solution 
would be to provide for a five year adjustment period,since pre-
dicting the rate of future appreciation is difficult. Basing the 
amount of the annual increase on an objective factor, in a man-
ner similar to variable rate mortgage payments, offers another 
possible solution. 
By adjusting all assessments to a median value, government 
revenues could be maintained at their present levels, while taxes 
could be equalized for similiarly situated owners. Homeowners 
would still be able to accurately predict their future tax liabili-
ties because the base assessment would remain fixed, and the 
inflation factor would allow maximum increases which are set in 
advance. New buyers would take their seller's tax base, thereby 
avoiding the constitutional problem of the present system. 
d. Charge a Transfer Tax upon Sale 
Another solution, charging a transfer tax based on a prop-
erty's sale price, would allow long-time homeowners to pay their 
proportionate share of the state's tax burden, but only upon re-
alization of their property's appreciated value. 
Because of the problems associated with trying to determine 
a transfer tax that would equalize all taxes, this solution would 
be difficult to implement. A payment cap would accomplish the 
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same goal of delaying payment until sale, but would assure 
equality in asessments. 
e. Increase the Assessments and Lower the Rate 
Since two of the purposes of Proposition 13 were to cut gov-
ernment spending and to provide "effective property tax relief', 
another, and arguably the best, solution to Proposition 13's con-
stitutional weaknesses would be to equalize assessments at mar-
ket value but cut the tax rate to keep revenues constant. 
To illustrate, when the assessment on a home bought for 
$50,000 is increased to its market value of $200,000, the tax rate 
could be cut from one percent of the property's appraised value 
currently required under Proposition 13 to a lower percentage. 
While some taxpayers would, under such a scheme, face a tax 
increase, the magnitude of any such increase would be much less 
than if the percentage were not lowered. 
The tax rate can be made variable, adjusting every year to 
maintain government revenues at present rates. An inflation fac-
tor can be incorporated to allow reasonable increases in revenues 
as required to maintain the same level of services. This solution 
would retain the spirit of the initiative while avoiding severe 
burdens on any class of property owners. 
3. Conclusions 
The large variety of recommendations above illustrate that 
there are less restrictive means to accomplish Proposition 13's 
goals. Whether these will be looked at by a court depends in 
large part on the level of scrutiny above. In light of the inequi-
ties created by the present system, and the wide variety of alter-
native methods to accomplish the same goals, the balance should 
be considered by a court. 
While Proposition 13 has accomplished its purpose of lower-
ing taxes for property owners, it has done so at the expense of 
the recent home buyer. The yearly two percent increase allowed 
by Section 2(b) has been unable to keep pace with rapidly rising 
property appreciation in California during the past decade, 
thereby widening the gap between the amount of taxes paid by 
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pre- and post-1975 property purchasers. 
The disparity created by assessing property based on its ac-
quisition date unfairly allocates the tax burden between these 
two classes of homeowners because it forces recent property 
owners to pay more for government services than do neighbors 
who have enjoyed these services for a longer period of time. 
Under Proposition 13 as it exists today, it is impossible to "sea-
sonably" achieve a "rough equality" in tax treatment in Califor-
nia. Therefore, if the strict standard of the Allegheny decision is 
applied to Proposition 13, the initiative would be found 
unconstitutional. 
If this occurs it does not mean that all control on state and 
local property taxes in California will be eliminated. Proposition 
13 provides a mechanism for removing unconstitutional portions 
of the initiative without voiding the whole. Since the constitu-
tional infirmiry would be limited to section 2, the rest of Pro-
position 13 could be preserved. Section 2 can be revised in a 
number of ways to equalize taxes for similarly situtated owners, 
while still maintaining government revenues. 
Thus, in conclusion, only section 2 of Proposition 13 should 
be modified to remove the constitutional infirmiry. The initia-
tive has succeeded in providing real property tax relief, and gov-
ernment services have not collapsed as a result. Since the bene-
fits of Proposition 13 can be maintained, and the inequities 
cured, by a minor modification, either the legislature or the judi-
ciary should act to correct the current imbalance in taxes. 
Bruce Stephan* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991. 
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